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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.  
 John Dondero appeals a summary judgment rejecting 
his constitutional and statutory claims arising out of his 
termination as Chief of Police in Lower Milford Township 
without a hearing. We agree with the District Court that no pre-
termination hearing was required when the Township 
eliminated its police department. And because Dondero’s other 
claims lack merit, we will affirm.  
I 
Dondero served as the Lower Milford Township Chief 
of Police from 2006 until the Township eliminated the 
department in 2016. As Chief, Dondero reported directly to 
Township Manager Ellen Koplin. The Board of Supervisors, 
including Koplin, manage the Township’s operations. 
Dondero’s relationship with the Supervisors was rocky. He 
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often publicly disagreed with them about the Township’s 
safety policies and practices. In 2013, he openly supported, and 
campaigned for, a challenger to one of the Supervisors. 
While on duty in June 2015, Dondero suffered 
temporary but “serious and debilitating injuries” from entering 
a burning building in response to a fire call. Dondero Br. 6. At 
the time of his injury, Dondero was the only active member of 
the police department. While incapacitated, Dondero received 
disability benefits under Pennsylvania’s Heart and Lung Act 
(HLA). But he fell out of touch with his boss, Koplin, going 
more than two months without contacting her. In early 2016, 
Koplin sent Dondero a letter requesting updated medical 
documents to verify his continued qualification for HLA 
benefits.  
A few weeks later, citing financial concerns, the 
Supervisors passed a resolution to disband the Township police 
department. In March 2016, the Supervisors enacted Ordinance 
No. 128, officially eliminating the department. From the time 
of Dondero’s work-related injury through the elimination of 
the Township police department—a period of more than nine 
months—the Pennsylvania State Police provided Township 
residents full-time police coverage at no extra cost to the 
Township taxpayers. 
In April 2019, after several earlier filings and 
modifications, Dondero filed his Second Amended Complaint. 
He alleged retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and 
violations of substantive and procedural due process. He also 
claimed an unlawful conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 
1985, municipal liability based on discriminatory Township 
policies, and a violation of the Pennsylvania state constitution. 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
4 
Township on all counts. Dondero timely appealed the federal 
claims. 
II 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s summary 
judgment de novo. Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 
142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016). 
III 
A 
We begin with Dondero’s procedural due process 
arguments. Dondero claims the Township had to conduct a 
hearing before dissolving the police department and 
terminating his HLA benefits. He also claims entitlement to a 
hearing to clear his name. We analyze each argument in turn. 
1 
Dondero contends he was entitled to a hearing before 
the Township eliminated the police department and terminated 
his employment. The Due Process Clause’s procedural 
protections apply when a person is deprived of a property 
interest protected by state law. See Bd. of Regents of State Coll. 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 577 (1972).  
Dondero correctly argues he had a property interest in 
his continued employment as a police officer. When public 
employees may be discharged only for cause, they have a 
property interest in their jobs. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 
928–29 (1997) (“[P]ublic employees who can be discharged 
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only for cause have a constitutionally protected property 
interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without due 
process.”); accord Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 n.8 
(1976). In Pennsylvania, regular, full-time police officers can 
be “suspended, removed, or reduced in rank” only for an 
enumerated list of reasons. See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
§ 812. So Dondero had a property interest in his employment. 
 So what process was Dondero due? Property interests 
and process usually go hand-in-hand—typically in the form of 
a pre-termination hearing. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70 & n.7. 
But as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has recognized, 
“a limited ‘reorganization exception’ to due process” exists 
“that eliminates the need for a hearing where a reorganization 
or other cost-cutting measure results in the dismissal of an 
employee.” Whalen v. Mass. Trial Ct., 397 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 
2005). Several other courts have held likewise. See, e.g., Misek 
v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1986); Dwyer v. 
Regan, 777 F.2d 825, 833 (2d Cir. 1985), modified 793 F.2d 
457, 457 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Hartman v. City of 
Providence, 636 F. Supp. 1395, 1410 (D.R.I. 1986) (collecting 
cases); Perkiomen Twp. v. Mest, 522 A.2d 516, 519–20 (Pa. 
1987) (recognizing the reorganization exception in 
Pennsylvania); cf. Mandel v. Allen, 81 F.3d 478, 482 (4th Cir. 
1996) (rejecting the argument “that once a state position is 
created, it is unconstitutional to subsequently alter or abolish 
that position without an individualized hearing”). 
We agree with those courts and hold that the Due 
Process Clause does not require a pre-termination hearing in a 
case that involves a legitimate government reorganization. 
This exception makes sense because when governments 
reorganize in good faith, their decisions concern positions—
not individuals. That change in focus puts the office-holder in 
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the same shoes as any other citizen, so “the hearing[s] 
contemplated by the Supreme Court’s due process precedent 
lose[ their] relevance.” Whalen, 397 F.3d at 25. In 
reorganization cases, there are no charges against the 
employee, and there is no reason to hold an individual hearing 
for a matter of public concern. See Kusza v. Maximonis, 70 
A.2d 329, 331 (Pa. 1950); see also Digiacinto v. Harford Cnty., 
818 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D. Md. 1993) (“[I]f an employee is 
losing her job not because of allegedly deficient performance 
but for extraneous reasons relating to fiscal and operational 
concerns, a hearing regarding the quality of the employee’s 
performance would serve no useful purpose.”). 
 But this exception is not absolute. A government may 
not “cry ‘reorganization’ in order to circumvent the 
constitutional and statutory protections guaranteed” to its 
employees. Misek, 783 F.2d at 101. In Pennsylvania, for 
example, courts have explained the exception does not apply 
when “the abolition was a mere pretense or subterfuge.” 
Perkiomen, 522 A.2d at 520. “The pretense or subterfuge must 
have been designed to evade a court order, or be evidenced by 
the recreation of substantially the same job under a different 
name or title.” Id.; see also Carey v. City of Altoona, 16 A.2d 
1, 2 (Pa. 1940); Misek, 783 F.2d at 101 (recognizing similar 
exceptions). 
 Dondero claims just that, arguing that the Township’s 
reorganization was merely a subterfuge to retaliate against him. 
We agree with the District Court that the record does not 
support that claim. Although Dondero argues the elimination 
of the department was an “effort to circumvent and ‘hedge’ 
against an anticipated Court Order,” Dondero Br. 50, no such 
order exists, nor are there pending matters in another court 
related to Dondero’s rights as a public employee. Just as a 
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government cannot “cry ‘reorganization,’” to avoid a hearing, 
see Misek, 783 F.2d at 101, a plaintiff cannot overcome the 
reorganization exception by assuming some “potential future 
order.” And because Dondero does not suggest the Township 
substantially recreated his job under a different name or title, 
that alternative path to show pretense or subterfuge is also 
closed.  
 In sum, the police department was eliminated through a 
valid government reorganization. And because Dondero 
cannot show the reorganization was illegitimate, he was not 
entitled to a pre-termination due process hearing. 
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 Dondero next claims a due process violation when the 
Township deprived him of disability payments under the HLA 
without a hearing. Looking once more to state law, see Roth, 
408 U.S. at 577, Pennsylvania courts have recognized that 
police officers injured on the job have “a constitutionally 
protected property right in [their HLA] benefits.” Adams v. 
Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 621 A.2d 1119, 1120 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1993). That right exists so long as the officer 
remains a member of the department. See Camaione v. 
Borough of Latrobe, 567 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1989). 
 In Camaione, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
addressed whether a locality could involuntarily retire a police 
officer (and terminate his HLA benefits) for economic reasons 
without first providing the officer a hearing. The Court said 
yes, noting the HLA did not “confer[] any rights upon injured 
officers as to the terms of their employment.” Id. at 641. The 
Act, the Court explained, does “no more than assure 
uninterrupted compensation of salary for current members of 
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a police force while a temporary incapacity exists.” Id. 
(emphasis added). Although it guaranteed that “while an 
officer is a member of the police force his temporary incapacity 
status cannot be changed without a due process hearing,” the 
HLA did not remove the Township’s “right to hire, fire, 
furlough or retire” its officers. Id. at 640–41. In essence, when 
an officer is fired, furloughed, or retired, no hearing is needed. 
Id.  
 Dondero, like the officer in Camaione, was not entitled 
to a hearing before termination of his HLA benefits because 
his position was eliminated by the Township for economic 
reasons. In effect, Dondero was “removed . . . from the group 
of employees covered by the Act.” Id. The Township did not 
alter his incapacity status. Instead, it exercised its legitimate 
power of reorganization. See id. (“All that the [HLA] provides 
is that while an officer is a member of the police force his 
temporary incapacity status cannot be changed without a due 
process hearing.”). 
3 
Finally, Dondero contends the Township “deprived him 
of his constitutionally protected liberty interest in his good 
name” when it spread “false and defamatory” statements about 
him and denied him a name-clearing hearing. Dondero Br. 51, 
53. “[T]o make out a due process claim for deprivation of a 
liberty interest in reputation, [Dondero] must show a stigma to 
his reputation plus deprivation of some additional right or 
interest.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d 
Cir. 2006); see also id. (“We have referred to this as the 
‘stigma-plus’ test.”). “To satisfy the ‘stigma’ prong . . . the 
purportedly stigmatizing statement(s)” must be “public[]” and 
“false.” Id. Dondero fails both prongs. 
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Dondero offers two sets of statements he claims were 
stigmatizing. First, he points to a 2013 “extremely negative and 
stigmatizing professional performance review.” Dondero Br. 
53. Dondero offers no evidence suggesting the poor marks he 
received were false or that the Township made them publicly. 
Even if the review were conducted with retaliatory motives, 
those motives would be irrelevant to the name-clearing 
analysis. Name-clearing hearings require proof of publicity 
and falsity. See Hill, 455 F.3d 235–36. Without those elements, 
the performance review fails the “stigma-plus” test.  
Dondero also claims the Township publicized “false 
criminal accusations” that he violated the Pennsylvania HLA 
and “false and defamatory accusations of his malingering” 
after his June 2015 work injury. Dondero Br. 53. As evidence, 
Dondero cites an “inference” from letters he received from 
Koplin; specifically, a letter sent in January 2016. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 
No. 47-1, at 135:21–137:11; Dondero, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 597. 
But he offers an unreasonable reading of the letter. Koplin 
requested updated “medical documentation” about whether 
Dondero might be “able to return to full duty at present and, if 
not,” when his return could be expected. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 58-
7. There is no inference, much less an accusation, of criminal 
activity. Because the letter contains no falsehood, it also fails 
the “stigma” test. 
 The statements Dondero cites cannot satisfy the 
“stigma-plus” test. So we agree with the District Court that a 
name-clearing hearing was not required because Dondero was 
not denied any liberty interest in his reputation. 
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B 
We turn now to Dondero’s First Amendment retaliation 
claims. According to Dondero, the Township eliminated the 
police department in retaliation for exercising his First 
Amendment rights. To succeed on a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, Dondero must show his activity was (1) 
protected conduct under the First Amendment that (2) was a 
substantial and motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory 
action. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 466 
(3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 
F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014)). If Dondero shows both, the 
burden shifts to the Township to prove it would have taken the 
same action regardless of the protected conduct. Id. 
Dondero offers a litany of activities he undertook while 
Chief of Police as evidence of protected conduct. He opposed 
the police department’s downsizing and he supported 
unionizing. He accused Koplin of falsifying insurance 
documents and he spoke on her alleged tardiness and 
unexplained absences. Finally, he commented on a medical 
drop box and criticized the Township’s safety policies. 
Dondero also engaged in political activity.  
Assuming the First Amendment protects all those 
activities, Dondero’s retaliation claim still fails. To succeed, 
Dondero must show causation—he must establish the activities 
were substantial and motivating factors in his termination. See 
Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 
(3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]f there was not a causal relationship then 
the [Township] could not have engaged in its conduct in 
retaliation for [Dondero] having engaged in a protected 
activity.”). Our cases offer three avenues to establish causation. 
But Dondero satisfies none of them. 
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First, “an unusually suggestive temporal proximity 
between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory 
action” can establish causation. Id. Dondero’s most recent 
protected activity—speech about Koplin’s tardiness and 
unexplained absences—took place from July to October 2015. 
His position was eliminated in March 2016. Although “there is 
no bright-line rule for the time that may pass between protected 
speech and what constitutes actionable retaliation,” Conard v. 
Pa. State Police, 902 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2018), a five-
month gap is not “an unusually suggestive temporal 
proximity,” DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267. Compare Est. of 
Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 512 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(explaining two days is proximate enough), with id. (19 months 
is not), and Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 
(3d Cir. 2003) (under the comparable Title VII framework, 
three weeks was not proximate enough). The rest of Dondero’s 
protected activities took place at least a year before his firing, 
so their timeframes are not unusually suggestive. 
Second, “a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing” 
may establish a causal link. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267. 
Dondero offers several Township actions he claims show a 
pattern of antagonism: (1) attempts in 2013 and 2015 to 
eliminate the police chief position; (2) the January 2015 
cancellation of Dondero’s Township-provided cell phone plan; 
(3) an April 2015 “counseling” memorandum that was 
allegedly distributed throughout the community; and (4) 
Koplin’s opening of mail addressed to the Chief of Police 
while Dondero was on medical leave. Even assuming evidence 
existed to prove the Township took each of the alleged actions, 
they do not amount to a pattern of antagonism. Cost-reduction 
efforts, a disciplinary notice spawned by a public employee’s 
perceived shortcomings, and the reading of potentially time-
12 
sensitive safety communications while the only safety officer 
was on medical leave speak to the Township’s attempts to 
govern itself responsibly. They do not show a pattern of 
antagonism. 
Finally, the record as a whole may reveal evidence 
implying causation. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267. Although 
Dondero makes passing reference to the “record as a whole,” 
Dondero Br. 41, the dearth of evidence he offers does not imply 
causation. So we agree with the District Court: Dondero’s First 
Amendment retaliation claims are unpersuasive.1 
* * * 
The District Court did not err when it granted summary 
judgment to the municipal employers. Although Dondero 
 
1 Dondero also advances substantive due process, conspiracy, 
and Monell claims. “[F]or a property interest to be protected 
for purposes of substantive due process, it must be 
‘fundamental’ under the United States Constitution.” Hill, 455 
F.3d at 234 n.12. But public employment is not a fundamental 
right. Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142–43 (3d 
Cir. 2000). The conspiracy and Monell claims fail because of 
the lack of a legal harm. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“[A]ctionable civil conspiracy must be based on an existing 
independent wrong . . . that would constitute a valid cause of 
action if committed by one actor.” (quoting Posner v. Essex 
Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1218 (11th Cir. 1999))); Brown v. Pa. 
Dep’t of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 
F.3d 473, 482 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[F]or there to be municipal 
liability, there still must be a violation of the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights.”). 
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possessed a property interest in continued employment and in 
HLA benefits while he was a police officer, under the 
governmental reorganization exception, due process did not 
require a pre-termination hearing. We will affirm.  
